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Formula
One - Are drivers driven to win? (Sep.04 - Business ethic research paper) It was a cold October afternoon back in 1997. I was living in Helsinki, Finland and decided to watch the last race of the Formula One championship with some friends at the Corona Bar downtown. This European Grand Prix held in Jerez, Spain was to mark the end of the season with a tight run to the championship where some significant ethical issues came to surface - again. This paper provides an analysis of the driving forces behind the action followed by a Kantian perspective review in an attempt to better understand the motivations and business interests in question. Before reaching this dimension, a brief description of the case is presented followed by a review of the driving forces, incident and associated corrective actions. The top contenders for the title in the race in question, were Michael Schumacher and Jacques Villeneuve, each of them starting with enough points to win the championship. All depended on their final position when crossing the checked flag at the end of the race with one important exception: Schumacher was starting with a one point advantage over Villeneuve. This meant that if both drivers were to not finish the race due to a mechanical problem or the like, Schumacher would be declared as the 1997 champion.  I
remember that the qualifying session, held the day before, had a particular
twist into it. Three drivers had the same qualifying times which set
the starting grid to be: Villeneuve, Schumacher and Frentzen. Villeneuve
lost the lead right from the start. He really struggled all the way
to regain his time advantage over Schumacher. On lap 48, he was 0.5
seconds behind him (Galvin, 1997) and decided that now it was the
time to take action. At Curva Dry Sack, Villeneuve saw an opening,
and he took a chance at overtaking Schumacher. Schumacher did not
give way and instead appeared to deliberately turn into Villeneuve’s
path. The results: This incident damaged Schumacher’s Ferrari
car beyond repair and Villeneuve continued, albeit with a limping
car, but strong enough to finish the race. He had then won the 1997
Formula One championship title.This was not the first time this type of accident took place in Formula One. It also happened in 1994 during the Australian Grand Prix. This time the fight was between Hill and Schumacher. And again in 1990 during the Japan Grand Prix where Senna closed in on Prost. (Horton, 1997) From this incident the following questions remained unanswered:
As an example, an outside company’s decision to sponsor a team is greatly influenced by the amount and quality of publicity they will get from this substantial promotional investment. The person within the team that has the most control over this is the car driver. The same applies to other types of revenue generation. The pressure to do well from this point of view surely must account for a large percentage of the reason why a driver will act in a certain way. But is it the main reason? Rules and regulations defined by the Fédération International de l’Automobile (FIA) have been put in place to ensure the safety and fairness of the competition. At the same time, they are enforced to remind the competitors that their conduct on the track is more than a business proposition. Surely the drivers must take these regulations into consideration. With The rules #52 to #55 of the FIA 2004 Formula One sporting regulations document (FIA, 2003) address the definition of an incident reported to the stewards by the race director which, for example: 
Accordingly, chapter IV of Appendix “L” called: Code of Driving Conduct on Circuits (FIA, 2004) sets the rules associated with overtaking. It details, among others, the yielding practices from a slower driver point of view, curves negotiation prohibiting dangerous driving conditions, obstructive maneuvers and flag signalization rules. These regulations are very specific and dictate the way drivers should behave on the track when it comes to overtaking maneuvers. So, according to the business drivers and rules described above, was the European Grand Prix incident a calculated maneuver or an accident? The FIA book doesn’t help in answering this question but the drivers’ post-race comment might help to shed some light on the subject. This is what Villeneuve had to say during the press conference about Schumacher’s behavior: “I was not really surprised when he finally decided to turn in on me, it was a little bit expected and I knew I was taking a bit of a risk (FIA, October 1997).” In a separate interview following the incident Schumacher said: “I am a human like everyone else and unfortunately I made a mistake. I don’t make many but I did this time.” Furthermore he mentioned that: “You are so determined to fight and do your best. I took the wrong judgment. I will have to live with the consequences of this (Viveen, 1997).” Formula One drivers have a tremendous ability to withstand risk and competition within a risky environment. It is what keeps them alive. The October 1997 incident is no exception. Looking at their post-race comments stated above, one could almost believe that this was an accident within a calculated maneuver to take the lead in the championship. Horton from the AtlasF1 magazine wrote an important article where he reflects on the sport prior to the Senna and Prost incident in 1988. In those days, he reports, it was a common understanding that “swerving” and “shutting the door firmly” within a slipstreaming pass was against the racing spirit. There was no rule to enforce this, it was just taken for granted (Horton, 1997). While earlier the drivers relied on a common sense approach in their decision making, now they seem to have shifted their decision to a special workgroup that decide on the penalty associated with a misconduct. This means that the drivers no longer needed to behave ethically on the track because “big brother” is watching the race. This has probably influenced the drivers to push their risk-taking preference to the limit as in their mind it doesn’t matter what the outcome is since the parties proven guilty will be punished according to the regulations in place. The group that is responsible for making the ultimate decision is the World Motor Sport Council. In the case of the incident of lap 48, this is what their investigation and hearing of the parties concluded: “The world Council found that Michael Schumacher’s manoeuvre was an instinctive reaction and although deliberate not made with malice and premeditation. It was a serious error (FIA, November 1997).” The penalties associated with this ruling were that Schumacher was excluded from the drivers’ 1997 championship, and he was required to participate in the FIA European road safety campaign in lieu of any further penalty or fine. As a spectator this decision was hard to understand. It didn’t feel that it would have a positive impact on preventing future misbehaviors. This type of penalty has little or no bearing on the drivers’ pride and provides no incentive to limit the re-occurrence of such an incident. The disappointing fact is that actions of this kind have the potential of physical injuries and there is no evidence that this aspect has been taken into consideration when deciding on the corrective action. 
With this background information, we can start looking at this case
study from an ethicist’s perspective. Here the chosen philosophical
system for this discussion is the one of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804).
Kant’s theory is said to be non-consequentialist meaning that
moral rules are defined by reason not necessary by action as in a
utilitarian world. Kant wrote: “The basis of obligation must
not be sought in human nature, [nor] in the circumstances of the world”
(Shaw, 2002, p56).William H. Shaw (2002) presents Kant’s theories in his book called Business Ethics. It is used as a source of reference in this research paper. In his book, Shaw states that Kant takes the approach that good will, or acting from principles, is what matters. He takes a strong position by stating that a moral act is right only when it is done out of duty – acting out of feelings as an example is not a moral act. It can be said that the Formula One calculated maneuver type of overtaking carried out during the October 1997 race was not a moral act according to this theory. It would be hard to imagine that the drivers involved in the incidents where acting out of duties. It is almost guaranteed that feelings were involved. At least one would want to believe that it was this way! Kant’s approach differs from that of utilitarian, as he doesn’t allow for a hypothetical imperative. Instead he defines a concept called a categorical imperative where the act is right only if it can become a universal law. This universal law could be explained by the famous saying: “Treat others like you would want to be treated”. Here again the odds are against the drivers as it is most likely that nobody would like anyone to treat them the same way as they have treated others themselves. The application of universal law around this maneuver is impossible. Shaw (p60) continues his discussion by introducing the practical application of Kant’s theory to an organization. He uses the following three lines of reasoning:
If we hypothesize for a moment that Schumacher had decided not to close in on Villeneuve so to avoid the associated penalty then the same conclusion would hold. The mere fact that the decision would have been made to avoid the results labels it as immoral according to Kant. It could also be said that Villeneuve had a duty to ensure safety of the action. Did he push a bit too much? The reputation of the sport is at risk not only that of the drivers. If these unethical issues continue, the sponsors, spectators and TV broadcasters will withdraw their support. This will in turn seriously affect the main business revenue streams that are much needed for the survival of the business. The spectators are tired of this constant unsportsmanlike type of behavior. It is time for the human aspect of the sport to enter the scene. One should not forget that people’s lives are at stake. It is important to see that the FIA is taking the punishment task seriously. However, it would be preferable to see the responsibilities where the original decisions are made, i.e. in the driver’s seat. This would reduce the use for a middleman, referred here as the FIA, and transform the sport back to its original state where common sense was practiced on a voluntary basis. Formula One drivers should show their excellent skills from a different angle. That is what spectators would like to see and support. Unethical behavior should not be accepted on the track. The punishment should be hard and of irreversible nature. The European Grand Prix of October 1997 will live in my memory as a great example of what not to do. And it will stay like that until some concrete actions to change the current way are implemented. As my Business Ethics Professor, Elaine E. Englehardt, mentioned during one of her lectures: “It takes a while to make a change”. So let’s start it now and make it towards the right direction! |
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